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  Fortunately for the dancers, the complex operation quickly began to unravel. Zach developed an eye infection, probably conjunctivitis, which effectively incapacitated him for the rest of the month. While recuperating, a supply contractor named von Bienenfeld informed the chief of staff the army’s magazines at Ceva, Mondovi and Acqui were severely depleted. To keep the army supplied in the field would take an extra six weeks of planning.9 While Zach raged about the contractor’s incompetence, the weather suddenly turned for the worse. On the night of 13/14 February, there was heavy snowfall on the main Apennine routes, making them impassable even for spies. Even though it was likely this snow would clear after a few days of fine weather, Radetzky took this opportunity to administer the coup de grace to Zach’s plan.

  While the chief of staff was wallowing in his bed, surrounded by his maps and charts, Radetzky went to see Melas’ wife, Josepha. It appears Radetzky was something of a favourite of Josepha’s, and perhaps more importantly, the two were both from the old Bohemian nobility. Radetzky explained the difficult conditions in the mountains; conditions her poorly husband would have to endure if the expedition went ahead. Radetzky asked Josepha to have a word with her husband, and get him to see the sense in cancelling the operation until the better weather came. Despite having signed an order to commence the operation a few days previously, when Melas heard about poor weather in the passes, potential supply problems and of course Zach’s poor health, he did not hesitate to sign the counter-order Radetzky placed before him.

  The first Zach knew about the counter-order was when Biking interrupted his meeting with Faverges. When the half-dressed, enraged Zach finally encountered Radetzky, he was told the attack had been cancelled for three reasons: the bad weather, Melas’ ill-health and the chief of staff ’s eye infection. Despite the willingness to proceed with the operation by a number of the column commanders, some of whom were marching in perfect sunshine, the counter-order had done its work and caused considerable confusion. Everyone returned to their winter quarters.

  The opportunity to seize Savona by surprise was lost. The attack on Liguria was delayed, bringing the opening of the alpine passes ever closer. In fact the operation to take Liguria did not begin until 6 April and this delay was to have fatal consequences, as it afforded Massena a little time to restore the Army of Italy to something resembling a fighting force. We know how Zach felt about this turn of events, as he confided in Faverges years after the event (Faverges’ brother had by then married Zach’s daughter). Faverges remembered how the ‘dignified general still pulled his hair out about the missed opportunity’.

  Before closing this chapter, we should conclude with a postscript on the adventures of Faverges, as he does not follow us all the way to Marengo. Through the course of March, Zach received reports of French movements on Mont Cenis, the principal alpine route from Turin to France. The Austrian chief of staff sent Faverges to investigate, this time allocating him a small squad of soldiers, which included a Hungarian corporal, a drummer and eight ‘crafty’ Croats, strapping fellows who could have ‘drunk the cellars of Heidelberg dry’. Leaving imperial headquarters, Faverges headed for the town of Susa at the foot of the road leading up to the pass. He stopped off there to meet another uncle, Télémaque Costa, who had been fighting in the mountains since 1793 and was an expert in ambush warfare. Uncle Télémaque was evidently something of a character: ‘He was an excellent man, crazily brave, friend of the peasants, heartthrob of their wives, generous with his money, full of spirit, and delighted every time he could play a trick on the French.’ In addition to the latest intelligence, Uncle Télémaque furnished Faverges with some practical advice: the address of two ladies who had ‘hosted’ him for a long time at Oulx, the next major settlement on the road. Arriving at the town, he invited himself to dinner but was crestfallen to find ‘the spinsters were on guard’.

  A week or so later, Faverges and his men were attacked in a French raid. While his men sheltered behind willow trees and returned fire, Faverges tried to reach a position of cover. Unfortunately he was struck. At first Faverges thought it was just a bruise, but his leg began to stiffen. When the French pressed their attack, Faverges crawled off into a trench, where he was helped to the rear by a soldier wounded in the hand. Reaching safety, he paid two soldiers to carry him back to Susa, where they deposited him on a cart. By midnight he arrived at his mother’s house in Turin. A doctor was summoned and at daybreak Dr Rossi arrived at the house. He made Faverges roll on his stomach and told him to bite down on the sheets and not to move, regardless of how much pain he felt. Faverges described the sensation as being cut with a knife made of violin strings. By the time the operation was finished, Faverges had passed out into a long deep sleep. It was the end of that war for him. For six days they feared tetanus would strike. Faverges’ family and companions took turns to maintain a bedside vigil throughout.

  Then one morning, just as his mother was reapplying the bandage on his foot, Colonel von Fellen of the Furstenberg Infantry Regiment came into the room. Speaking in German he informed Faverges his younger brother, Clément, had just been killed in a skirmish near Novi. Three officers had been killed in succession, and the men had hesitated. Clément took the lead and apparently shouted to the troops, ‘I am only a white beak [i.e. too young to shave]; forward you old beards!’ They raced off, but Clément was struck by a ball in the head and killed. He was just 17 years old. Faverges’ mother listened to the colonel without understanding a word he said, but a mother’s intuition could read on the officer’s face what had occurred and she asked him nothing. ‘Poor mother,’ Faverges wrote ruefully. Many more mothers that year were destined to share her pain.

  Chapter 4

  French Preparations

  The history books record precious little about Sub-Lieutenant Pierre Tourné. In 1800, he was about 28 years old and serving as an aide-de-camp (ADC) to General Henri Clarke, the Franco-Irish head of the Ministry of War’s Topographical Office. Tourné had joined the colours in 1793, a volunteer in the 11th Battalion of Paris, and risen to the rank of sergeant-major when he was commissioned and selected for staff work. Evidently intelligent, he was instructed to make a reconnaissance of the route leading up to the Simplon and Great St Bernard passes just a few weeks after Faverges had performed a similar duty on the other side of the icy mountain range.

  This mission was particularly important because, with the approach of spring, Bonaparte’s attention became increasingly fixed on Switzerland and the opportunities it afford him. Since the fall of Cuneo, the easiest route into the great valley of the Po had been closed to him. Although it was not impossible to fight his way over the mountains from Savona and Genoa, the Austrians would likely see him coming and perhaps mount a counter-offensive in Germany. Then he would be too far away to react effectively. Bonaparte’s preference was to keep his Army of the Reserve in the central position, opposite Switzerland. This would keep the Austrians guessing over his intentions, he supposed. He would launch an offensive in Germany with Moreau, and at the same time keep the Austrians busy around the Apennines with Massena. When the Austrians were pinned in position, he would pass through Switzerland with the reserve and fall on Milan, cutting Melas’ lines of communication. It was a bold plan – perhaps even startling – and it was full of risk.

  The first priority was to find a safe route over the mountains practicable for artillery. From the region around Zurich there were two routes which could be used for a descent on Milan, the Splugen or St Gotthard passes. Bonaparte had the former scouted by his ADC Duroc on 31 January. At the beginning of March, Lemarrois was ordered to look at the former. Bonaparte also wished to examine the shortest routes into Italy through the Valais (the upper Rhone valley) via the Simplon and Great St Bernard passes. The information held in the archives of the dépôt de la guerre (military records office) was insufficient to gauge the state of the country, so Tourné was sent with three objectives:

  1. To reconnoitre the nature of the roads from
Lausanne to Sion and to the St Gotthard; to also reconnoitre the passages of the St. Bernard and the Simplon; to learn if artillery and wagons could pass by these positions.

  2. To reconnoitre the situation of all the villages, place by place; to note their population, their resources, especially in fodder.

  3. To add to this intelligence everything which Tourné believed useful to collect.

  The ensuing report, dated 31 March 1800, was extremely thorough and described something of a lost world cut off from neighbouring regions. The Valais, Tourné reported, extended from Saint-Maurice to the St Gotthard and took the form of a valley 40‑50 leagues in length, and ½-¾ of a league wide (a league being approximately 4km, or an hour’s normal march for infantry). It was bordered on each side by a long chain of mountains and was rendered almost impractical in winter due to snow. In the centre of the valley flowed the Rhone, which came very close to the mountains in many locations and formed deep chasms or marshes. The inhabitants were extremely poor, eking out a living on scraps of ground with landslides and floods to contend with. Many places had been devastated and burned during the war. What little grass did grow nourished the cattle, which were the only remaining resource of the country. Despite this, the strategic value of the Valais was critical. If the enemy were to capture the passes, there were a number of smaller passes which would allow them to advance into Switzerland towards Germany.

  Tourné provided a detailed description of the route he took to the Great St Bernard. Exiting Lausanne, he approached the Valais by following the shores of Lake Geneva. The ground was very fertile and rich, and as he entered the Valais, he found the land was initially broad and fairly flat. At Saint-Maurice, Tourné crossed a stone bridge and entered the Valais proper, continuing on to Martigny, where the road to the Great St Bernard Pass was joined. The road was flanked by the River Dranse, which formed a deep gorge. At Orsières was a branch on the track which led to Ferret, a little pass which turned the Great St Bernard Pass and was guarded by a company of men in the summer months when the route was practical. After Orsières, the path became much steeper, beginning to zigzag past some smaller villages. As Tourné approached Bourg-Saint-Pierre, the road became increasingly narrow. At this village of less than 150 inhabitants, Tourné found mules which could be used for carrying loads up to the final ascent to the pass. The track leading up to Proz was no more than 2‑3ft wide, littered with stones and bordered by a steep ravine. Reaching this place, the ground opened up a little and he began the steep ascent to the summit. Tourné described the path as zigzagging with five or six turns and becoming increasingly steep for the last hour-and-a-half to the pass. The snow here only melted for one or two months of a year, and if someone strayed from the path, they would remain buried there. At the pass was a monastery about 80ft in length and 20ft wide. The monks lived on the first floor. On the other side of the pass, the road began its descent. Tourné described a dozen soldiers guarding the pass, with twenty more in reserve at the convent. Although the slope was quite steep, the road was good – 3‑4ft wide. If an ascent of the Great St Bernard was attempted, there was only enough room for three or four companies of men at the hospice. There was insufficient firewood, and it was too cold to bivouac in the open. The soldiers would have to reach Saint-Rhemy on the enemy side of the pass the same day they quit Bourg-Saint-Pierre. As for the enemy, Tourné learned with some accuracy that the Aosta valley was guarded by a battalion of the Kinsky Regiment and 500 Croatians. The French held the summit, although the entire Valais was protected by only a single half-brigade (the 28th) of just 2,000 men. When the passages cleared after the winter, it was critical to get more men to defend them, lest the Austrians in the valley below become more active.

  The report concluded it was possible to use both the Great St Bernard and Simplon passes, and also the St Gotthard. The key advantage of using the Great St Bernard route, Tourné reported, was it only had 2‑3 leagues of difficult terrain at the end. The Simplon was a far harder enterprise by comparison, with steeper roads and a longer difficult section. The Great St Bernard was also nearer to Lake Geneva, and supplies could be ferried to the entrance of the Valais from the magazines in Geneva. From there, the stores and equipment could be carried by mules. Where mules could pass, so could cavalry – although only in small detachments at a time. In terms of bringing vehicles up to the Great St Bernard, Tourné believed it was possible to use light wagons as employed by the locals; but after Bourg-Saint-Pierre, he recorded that ‘extraordinary means’ would be required to move artillery. ‘This enterprise is not impossible to carry out,’ he wrote. ‘It would be necessary to dismount the pieces and place them on strong, narrow sledges.’ These sledges could be transported to Bourg-Saint-Pierre on wheels, but then dragged the last leg of the journey. An experiment had been conducted the previous year moving a howitzer across the Simplon. It had been difficult, but it was possible.

  While Tourné was scouting the alpine routes, the Army of the Reserve was beginning to take shape. The secret decree of 8 March 1800 confirmed:

  Art. 1. There shall be organized a reserve army of 60,000 men.

  Art. 2. It shall be directly commanded by the First Consul.

  Art. 3. The artillery shall be commanded by General Saint-Rémy; the park by Chief of Brigade Gassendi; the engineers by the First Inspector of Engineers, Marescot.

  Art. 4. Disbursing officer [ordonnateur] Dubreton shall perform the functions of Chief Disbursing Officer.

  Art. 5. The different organizations and the conscripts that are to compose this army shall immediately take up the march for Dijon; they shall be cantoned in the towns within a radius of twenty leagues.

  Art. 6. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the present decree. He shall use every means to have collected at Dijon all the material necessary for the arming, clothing, and equipping of the reserve army.

  BONAPARTE.

  On 3 March 1800, Bonaparte had already instructed the Minister of War, Berthier, to begin collecting the necessary stores at Dijon, including 100,000 pairs of shoes, 40,000 coats or greatcoats and other articles of clothing. Also that month, Bonaparte made a series of direct appeals to the nation. If Frenchmen wanted peace, he stated, they would have to pay for it in ‘money, iron and soldiers’. While Bonaparte had been in Egypt, France had introduced the conscription law of 5 September 1798. This law stipulated all bachelors from the age of 20 to 25 years were eligible for military service. Each year, the government would decide how many soldiers it required, and a ballot would be held to select them. The first draw would be from the ‘class’ of 20-year-olds, with the other classes balloted in turn as necessary. Some exemptions were made, and the men had to be medically fit for service. On 8 March 1800, Bonaparte passed a law which placed at the government’s disposal all Frenchmen whose twentieth year had been completed on 23 September 1799. This law sought to catch those who had slipped through the net of earlier ballots, and to penalize those unable to serve, imposing fines on the family in order to pay for the uniform and equipment of a man who was fit to serve. Those men who were considered better employed elsewhere, or undertaking studies, were required to provide a substitute, in other words privately contract a fellow citizen to undertake military service on their behalf.

  Former soldiers and veterans still capable of serving the country were also invited back to the colours. If they could not rejoin their old corps, they were to travel directly to Dijon where they would be armed and equipped, then formed into volunteer battalions. Those with the means to procure horses were invited to form volunteer squadrons, with the promise that the First Consul would name the officers of these formations personally. On 20 March, Bonaparte addressed all young Frenchmen, saying he had received many letters from young citizens who wished to serve their country. Bonaparte invited them to join the new Army of the Reserve and assured them ‘glory waits for them in Dijon’. In fact this call for volunteers to flock to Dijon was something of a smokescreen – a military ruse. Bonapart
e knew the Austrians would have spies inside the country, so by naming Dijon as the place of assembly, spies would be attracted to it. And what did they find there? A few hundred old men and boys – hardly an army. Meanwhile, the experienced, battle-ready half-brigades were marching from Paris or the western departments, passing through the Dijon region, collecting their new uniforms and stores, before marching off towards Switzerland. The hastily assembled volunteers were formed into something which eventually became a second Army of the Reserve. The deception appears to have worked, with the reserve being considered something of a laughing stock around Europe.

  Of the real army, the 1st Division under General Jacques-Antoine de Chambarlhac was one of the first to march. This was composed of three infantry half-brigades – the 24th Light, with the 43rd and 96th Line, in total 8,055 men under arms. These were divided into two brigades, each under the command of a brigadier general. General of Brigade Jean-Baptiste Herbin commanded the 24th Light; General of Brigade Olivier Rivaud the 43rd and 96th Line. There was in truth little difference between light and line infantry at the time. Their structure and organization was the same – each half-brigade comprising three battalions, each with nine companies of men (eight centre companies and an elite company). In the line, the centre companies were called fusiliers and the elite were grenadiers; in the light half-brigades, they were chasseurs (huntsmen) and carabiniers (carbinemen). By 1800, both types of infantry were equally capable of fighting in a loose skirmish formation (en tirailleur), or in line or column formations. The light infantry were generally selected from the smaller, hardier recruits; men who could march day and night, and were practised in scouting work. There was no difference in the armament used by either type of infantry – both employed the single-shot, smoothbore, flintlock, muzzle-loading 1777 pattern musket and bayonet. Rifles were rare, the French seeming to prefer weight of fire to slow-firing accuracy; and grenades were only ever used in siege warfare. The only visible difference between the two types of troops was that the light infantry wore a short-tailed coat and had shorter gaiters, both of which were concessions to better agility. Some light infantry had also begun to wear the shako by 1800, whereas line troops (including grenadiers) mostly wore the felt cocked-hat, or chapeau. Chambarlhac’s division also included an artillery component consisting of eight 8-pdr guns, and four 6in howitzers. When the guns were added to the ammunition wagons and forges, the division’s artillery component actually comprised eighty-three vehicles. There were 103 gunners in the division, with another 200 carters on paper. However, at the point the division left Paris, this last component had yet to be formed, so a call went out for volunteers from the infantry to man the wagons until the division reached Dijon.